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The recent killing of Hakimullah Mehsud,
the leader of the Tehrik-e-Taiban-e-Pakistan
(TTP), by a CIA drone strike has generated
much controversy over the implications of the
attack. On the one hand, American authorities, who had declared a $5 million bounty on
Hakimullah’s head, celebrated the event as a
successful strike and a positive development in
the on-going war on terror. On the other hand,
Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali
Kahn, condemned the incident, stating that the
elimination of Hakimullah will sabotage Pakistan’s efforts at forging a peace deal with the
TTP. In the same vein, many Pakistani political parties, from Imran Khan’s liberal Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), to the ultra Islamist
groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP)
and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), have all
denounced the attack, demanding that the Pakistani government block NATO’s logistical
supply line to Afghanistan that runs through Pakistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, too, expressed his criticism of the timing of the attack,
noting that it could affect Pakistan’s cooperation
with Afghanistan’s embryonic peace process.
This incident, and the divisive responses to it, revives the question of whether targeted
killing of insurgent leaders is an effective counterinsurgency tactic, an issue much debated in
academic and policy circles. Proponents of the
tactic argue that killing insurgent leaders incapacitates insurgent organizations, deters additional insurgent violence against the state, and
signals the determination of the state to fight
the insurgents. Opponents of the tactic warn
that targeted killing of an insurgent leader will
further radicalize his followers, triggering an
escalation of retaliatory attacks by the group
as a means of avenging the slain leader.
This paper falls within the later camp,
arguing that targeted killing of insurgent leaders has minimal operational value, which is
substantially outweighed by its unwanted consequences. I must clarify that by insurgent leaders,
I mean the supreme leaders of insurgent groups;

not their operational commanders. I maintain
that through “routinization” and “institutionalization” of a leader’s charisma, his importance
to the survival and functioning of an insurgent
organization decreases over time. Therefore, his
elimination is less likely to pose a major blow
to the organization. Meanwhile, the killing of a
leader will likely further radicalize the group by
(a) turning the slain leader into an iconic “martyr”, which will inspire followers to engage in retaliatory action to avenge the leader’s blood; and
(b) giving the insurgent organization a sense of
being under siege and attack, thereby facilitating
the rise to power of more radical elements within
the group. While these arguments are corroborated by many examples, I primarily focus on the
TTP, as the assassination of two of its supreme
leaders – Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 and
Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013 – provide rich ground for empirical analyses.
An Organizational Synopsis
Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) is an
umbrella organization of various Islamist militant groups that operate predominantly in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwah province of Pakistan. The organization was founded in 2007
by Baitullah Mehsud in order to unite the dispersed Pakistani militant groups in the area. The
TTP’s main objectives include the enforcement
of Sharia in Pakistan, fighting NATO forces in
Afghanistan, and conducting “defensive” jihad
against the Pakistani military. Currently, about
30 militant groups are believed to fight under the
TTP umbrella, commanding a total of 30,000 to
35,000 fighters.
The TTP has a loose organizational structure
where member groups enjoy considerable autonomy in their respective geographical areas, but
are collectively joined in the TTP and get strategic direction from its Emir, or the supreme leader. The organization is headquartered in South
Waziristan, but its area of operation extends

throughout the FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwah,
and lately in parts of Punjab and Sindh provinces. The TTP is also known to utilize ungoverned
territories in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nooristan
provinces, and has been linked to attacks against
Afghan and NATO installations in the country.
Although the TTP has conducted operations in Afghanistan against NATO and Afghan
security forces, its primary targets have traditionally been Pakistani government personnel
and installations. The TTP has been implicated
in many high profile terrorist and insurgent operations across Pakistan, including the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007; the bombing of the Marriot
Hotel in 2008; the massive attack on Pakistani
army’s headquarter in 2009; the assassination
attempt of young activist Malala Yousafzai in
2012; a number of massive jail breaks that freed
hundreds of militants; as well as hundreds of assaults, explosions, and suicide bombings against
military and civilian targets across Pakistan.
The TTP has also demonstrated its will to strike
targets beyond the borders of Pakistan, and has
shown some capacity to do so, most notably
with the December 2009 suicide bombing of a
CIA station in Khost, Afghanistan, as well as
the failed attempt to explode a car bomb in New
York’s Times Square in 2010.
Although drone attacks against the TTP
had been conducted for many years before, the
United States officially designated the TTP a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on 1 September, 2010. In addition to killing numerous
mid-level TTP commanders and personnel, CIA
operated drones have so far assassinated two of
the TTP’s top leaders – Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 , and Hakimullah Mehsud on 1 November, 2013. As the newly selected TTP leader,
Mullah Fazlullah has vowed to continue the legacy of his predecessors, and avenge Hakimullah’s
blood by increasing attacks against American
targets.
To Kill or to Let Live: An Unending Debate
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The “agency vs. structure” debate in social science divides scholars over the issue of
targeted killing of insurgent leaders. Generally,
those who advocate the use of the tactic emphasize the centrality of the leader’s personality in
the functioning and durability of an insurgent
organization, thereby arguing that the elimination of the leader will likely make the orga-
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nization dysfunctional. For instance, Kent Oots
asserts that “if the authorities can remove the
leadership, an organization will cease to function.” He highlights the significance of an insurgent leader in maintaining internal unity, arguing that the killing of a group’s leader will make
it prone to infighting and collapse. Observing
the Palestinian insurgent organizations, Steven
David emphasizes the role of the leader’s operational abilities, arguing that once killed, leaders
are difficult to replace due to the long time needed for the surrogates to acquire the same level
of experience and expertise. Daniel Byman also
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focuses on the operational aspect of leadership,
maintaining that killing an insurgent leader will
take away a group’s base of knowledge and skills
in conducting operations, mobilizing resources,
organizing financing, and synchronizing attacks.
Patrick Johnston’s findings through a large-N
analysis of insurgent organizations seem to corroborate these assertions, specifically claiming
that decapitating insurgent leaders “(1) increases the chances of war termination; (2)
increases the probability of government victory; (3) reduces the intensity
of militant violence; and (4) reduces
the frequency of insurgent attacks.”
On the other side of the debate are
scholars who believe that assassinating
insurgent leaders is counterproductive
to the overall effort of counterinsurgency. The core of this argument rests upon
the theories that emphasize the importance of the general political and strategic environment – rather than of single
insurgent leaders – to the durability and
effectiveness of an insurgent organization. These theories argue that insurgent organizations rest upon an array of
actors, institutions, and structures that
are rooted deeply in society. Therefore,
removing an insurgent leader will likely
have a minimal effect on the functioning
of the insurgent organization. Leaders
may be critical at the birth of an organization due to their charismatic abilities in organizing collective action, but their importance
decreases over time. For instance, Jenna Jordan
argues that a leader’s charisma can be transferred
to other individuals within the group; hence the
“removal of a leader would not necessarily result
in the collapse of an organization.” Elsewhere,
Jordan argues that “going after the leader may
strengthen a terrorist group’s resolve, result in
retaliatory attacks, increase public sympathy for
the organization, or produce more lethal attacks.”
Similarly, other scholars point to the
radicalization effect of leadership decapitation

of insurgent groups. Aaron Mannes claims that
killing insurgent leaders can cause “greater radicalization of the targeted terrorist group, elimination of possible negotiating partners, and the
triggering of retaliatory attacks.” In his study of
the Palestinian public opinion polls, David Jaeger found that after the Israeli killing of Palestinian insurgent leaders, approval ratings for more
radical figures increased. Peter Rosendorff and
Todd Sandler argue that by generating more
grievances, Israel’s targeted killing of Palestinian
insurgent leaders increases the recruitment of
new fighters into Palestinian insurgent groups.
Related to the public grievance argument is the
“martyrdom effect” of insurgent leader assassination. The argument is that instead of degrading a
group’s morale, killing its leader increases insurgents’ resolve, and intensifies their desire to use violence in retaliation for the government’s action.
Finally, scholars suggest that the threat
of targeting insurgent groups’ leaders pushes
the groups to decentralize, flattening their organizational structures as a means of defying the
impact of leadership assassination and increasing their durability. This trend is most evident
in the evolution of Al Qaeda after 9/11 into its
current networked structure. The assumption is
that as an organization becomes less hierarchical
and divided into multiple cells that are loosely
connected to each other, it becomes less vulnerable to state predation since it is no longer wholly
dependent upon a single leader or a single unit.
Independent parts will be capable of persisting
long after other parts have been neutralized.
The debate over the effectiveness of insurgent leader assassination is ongoing with no
final resolution in sight. While arguments on
both sides of the debate make conceptual sense,
a major weakness of the proponents of the tactic
is that they tend to evaluate the utility of the tactic quite narrowly. That eliminating an insurgent
leader has some operational value to a counterinsurgency campaign is unquestionable; what is
up for debate is whether its benefits are worth
enduring its unwanted costs. Since insurgency

is primarily a political phenomenon, the utility
of military action in a counterinsurgency campaign must be measured based on its political
ramifications for the overall war effort.
Theoretical Argument
The centerpiece of my argument in this
paper is that targeted killing of insurgent leaders causes more harm than benefit to a counterinsurgency campaign. This argument has
two parts. In the first part, I highlight two main
ways in which a leader plays an important role
within an insurgent organization, and show how
over time his importance to the functioning and
survival of the organization decreases. Killing
a leader, therefore, can make little difference to
an insurgent organization. In the second part, I
discuss two ways in which killing an insurgent
leader will likely further radicalize the group,
strengthening its resolve to intensify its violent
campaign against the state.
Leaders and Insurgent Organizations
Charismatic leadership can be instrumental in
the establishment, functioning, and survival of
an insurgent organization. The 19th century German sociologist, Max Weber, defined charisma as
a “quality of an individual personality by virtue
of which he is set apart from ordinary men and
treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers
or qualities.” According to Weber, these powers
and qualities “are not accessible to the ordinary
person, but are regarded as of divine origin or
as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.” Weber’s
definition of charisma is intentionally broad and
implies that different qualities in different categories of movements come to define charisma.
As Robert Tucker posits, qualities such as miracle-working powers in religiously salvationist
groups, revolution-making powers in political
revolutionary movements, or war-making capa-
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Operational Competence

bilities in movements that seek to achieve their
goals by military means, become important.
Using Tucker’s framework, charisma in the context of insurgent leaders can be
summed up in two categories of qualities. I
call them “inspirational persona” and “operational competence”, respectively:
Inspirational Persona
Because insurgent organizations are generally
revolutionary groups that are seeking to affect
political change through the use of political,
social and military means, a charismatic leader must have the ability to rally public support
behind his cause and convince people to respond to his call to arms . Insurgent groups
appear where there is some fundamental political or social problem, for which often the
state or a foreign occupier is blamed. A charismatic insurgent leader must be able to identify
the problem, propose a solution, and convincingly offer himself as one peculiarly qualified
to lead the people out of their predicament. He
must be able to create a strong ideological narrative that appeals to the followers. This means
a leader must have a vision and the ability to
communicate that vision clearly to his current
and potential followers. He needs to radiate an
idealized, heroic, selfless, and devoted public
image; one that would convince others to follow him by engaging in high-risk political and
military activity. This was most evident in the
case of many legendary insurgent leaders such
as Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara,
Ahmad Shah Masoud, and others.
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In addition to rallying public support for the
insurgents’ cause, conducting an insurgency
requires operational competence in mobilizing
resources such as money, weapons, equipment,
medical supplies, food, clothing, etc.; organizing safe havens, training grounds, instructors,
etc.; establishing organizational structures commensurate to the nature, size, and objectives of
the organization; creating strategic plans and
ensuring the implementation of those plans at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels;
and other functions of this nature. An insurgent
leader, therefore, must be a capable manager
and a shrewd strategist. He must be a master in
the use of various forms of warfare, including
guerrilla combat, terrorism, sabotage, intelligence and counterintelligence, and psychological warfare. He must know the utility of each
of these forms of warfare, and know when each
one must be used. An insurgent leader must be
able to integrate geography and terrain, weather, population, type of weapon, form of warfare, and the number and kind of fighters into
a unified strategy that would increase the effec-

tiveness of the overall insurgency campaign.
In sum, a charismatic insurgent leader
has a special persona that legitimizes him as
the leader of a group and rallies support behind him, as well as operational capabilities
that help him organize the group, garner resources, and develop and implement strategies.
Based on this reasoning, therefore, proponents
of the targeted killing of insurgent leaders argue that a leader is the most crucial part of an
insurgent group whose elimination can cripple,
even collapse the organization. However, as I
argue below, a leader’s inspirational persona is
routinized and his operational competence institutionalized, thereby limiting the importance
of the leader to the functioning of the organization over time.
Routinization and Institutionalization of Charisma
Max Weber referred to “routinization” and “depersonalization” as the process by which charisma undergoes a complete transformation from
an extraordinary and purely personal phenomenon into an established authority structure
that is no longer dependent upon the personal
powers and qualities of the incumbent leader. In the process of routinization, charisma is
transmitted from leader to leader through the
established rules of succession. Through depersonalization, charisma evolves into a hereditary phenomenon as exemplified in royal succession, or into institutional charisma attached
to an office as with the practice of priesthood.

Weber’s argument here is somewhat
self-contradictory, however. By Weber’s
own definition, charisma is fundamentally
a personal, even God-given, phenomenon,
so how can something that is by nature personal become depersonalized? Robert Tucker suggests that charisma does not become
depersonalized, but it becomes routinized
by continuing to survive within the movement in the form of the cult of the original
leader. It will still be something associated
with the personality of the original leader,
embodied within the movement as a legacy
that continues to inspire followers. Phenomena such as Marxism, Leninism, Maoism,
etc., that survived the leaders themselves are
examples of such routinization of charisma.
Succeeding leaders in the movement may be
viewed as representatives of the original leader, tasked with moving his legacy forward.
Tucker’s proposition is useful for our
discussion, but it covers only half of what
charisma entails in the context of insurgent
organizations. As discussed earlier, depending on the type and objective of a movement,
different qualities or powers in a leader come
to define charisma. In the case of insurgent organizations, charisma involves two categories
of qualities, what I called “inspirational persona” and “operational competence”, mastery
in both of which is required of a successful
insurgent leader. While inspirational persona
has to do with a leader’s personal charm and
ability to motivate followers, operational competence entails the leader’s practical skills in
organizing and leading an insurgent organization. To state that both of these qualities can
be routinized the way Tucker defines routinization – as charisma evolving into a cult or leg-
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CASE STUDY
This process is clearly visible in the evolution
of the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP). Baitullah Mehsud, the original TTP leader, played
a crucial role in igniting Islamist militancy in
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and later in unifying numerous militant groups under the TTP umbrella. By 2007,
Baitullah was well-known as the leader of the
strongest Pakistani militant group in the FATA,
and a natural candidate to lead the emerging
coalition of militant organizations called the
Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan. Especially known
for his deployment of suicide bombers, “[Baitullah] was more notorious in Pakistan than
Osama bin Laden and as feared as the Iraqi
insurgent Abu Musab al Zarqawi”. His alleged
assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 only
aided Baitullah’s fame locally, nationally, and
internationally.
Coming from a modest family background,
and with no formal education of any kind, Baituallah rose to prominence based purely on his
personal leadership qualities. His inspirational
persona made him a natural leader, enabling
him to rally widespread public support for his
cause and recruit thousands of fighters in the
span of two years. His power of persuasion enabled him to turn the numerous Pakistani militant
groups with no guiding principles or clear sense
of direction into a unified insurgent organization
with a defined ideology and established objectives. His ruthlessness, fearlessness, strategic
thought, and good managerial skills were vital
in mobilizing resources, establishing organizational structures, and ensuring the TTP’s evolution into a strong insurgent group capable of
conducting high profile attacks across Pakistan.
The TTP’s leadership succession shows an upward curve of radicalization, going from Baitullah to Hakimulla to Fazlullah. Upon the assassination of Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009,
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acy of the original leader within the movement
– would be misguiding. A more useful approach
would be to deal with inspirational persona and
operational competence separately, and demonstrate how these qualities are transferred from
an insurgent leader into the established authority and structure of the organization over time.
Inspirational persona is routinized over
time to become part of the organization’s culture, narrative, and ideology. It survives as the
legacy of the original leader long after he is dead,
transmitted to future generations of followers in
the form of theories, stories, legends, and myths.
While the organization inevitably undergoes
changes overtime, the cult of the original leader
remains as a broad guiding framework for action.
Innovations are often justified and legitimized as
part of the original leader’s legacy. Future leaders
may be viewed as the epitomes of the original
leader who follow his legacy by moving the organization’s cause forward. This means that the
leader himself gradually becomes irrelevant and
his death – especially if assassinated by the enemy
– will only strengthen his legacy and solidify his
cult as part of the ideology of the organization.
While a charismatic insurgent leader’s
inspirational persona is routinized, his operational competence is institutionalized over time.
Institutionalization in this context refers to the
process by which an insurgent leader’s practical
skills in managing personnel, handling finances, mobilizing resources, developing strategies
“The signers of the Declaration of Independence acknowledged their readiness for martyrdom when they
pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred
honor to the cause of freedom. Many Americans believed that George Washington made immeasurable
sacrifices for the cause of liberty when he suffered with
the half-clothed, half frozen heroes at Valley Forge.
Familiar with the general heritage of sacrifice and
martyrdom, American authors, poets, preachers, and
popular historians applied the title martyr to specific
individuals. They thus strove to invest the American
national experience with transcendent meaning and
to strengthen the American national consciousness
through solidarity with the sacrifice of a dead hero.”

and battle plans, etc. are absorbed within the
organization through transferring the skills to
other personnel; creating norms, standards, and
procedures; establishing bureaucratic structures
with specialized units; and developing policies
and strategies. At the birth of an insurgent organization, the leader personally handles, or at
least supervises the handling of, many of these
tasks. His skills are critical to the establishment
of the organization and for moving it forward.
But as the organization expands over time, it
becomes neither possible nor necessary for the
leader to engage in the handling of technical
day-to-day business. These responsibilities are
gradually transferred over to the bureaucracy
and then down to the chain of command. The
leader becomes confined to handling high-level political and strategic issues. Even at the
highest level, a leader often has a number of
deputies and confidants who conduct the actual work under his supervision. Thus, the leader becomes more or less symbolic, losing his
operational importance to the organization.
To sum up, a charismatic leader is essential to the birth and growth of an insurgent
organization, as he rallies support, recruits
fighters, mobilizes resources, establishes bureaucratic structures, and gives the organization an ideology and a sense of direction. But
the relationship of the leader to the organization
is dialectical – the more successful he is at establishing the organization, the less important
he becomes to the organization over time, due
to the routinization of his inspirational persona and the institutionalization of his operational competence. His assassination, therefore, will have a trivial, if any, impact on the
functioning and survival of the organization.
As the organization evolved over time,
however, Baitullah’s personal qualities and skills
became less important to the TTP. By the time
of his assassination in August 2009, the TTP was
well-known as the deadliest insurgent group in
the area, posing a serious challenge to the Pakistani government, as evidenced by several large

two serious candidates contested for succession
– Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman.
Hakimullah was by far more radical than his
competitor, notably in his fierce opposition to
peace talks and his commitment to stepping
up the organization’s violent campaign. Given the environment within the organization –
anger, fear, and paranoia – Hakimullah was
perceived as the strongest candidate and the
best fit to lead the TTP. And by all accounts,
the TTP became larger, stronger, deadlier, and more radicalized under Hakimullah’s
leadership as discussed earlier in this paper.
The same experience was repeated after the
recent assassination of Hakimullah. The new
leader Mullah Fazlullah became famous when
he began broadcasting daily sermons on illegal FM frequencies. In these sermons, he adamantly denounced the Pakistani state and the
American presence in neighboring Afghanistan,
calling for jihad against both. He also promoted his extreme interpretation of the Sharia,
condemning issues such as female education,
polio vaccination, as well as music and films.
Fazlullah primarily commanded the Taliban
group in Swat, establishing Sharia courts and
handing out savage punishments. Under Fazlullah’s reign of terror, the “Green Square in Mingora, the main town of Swat, became known
as ‘Bloody Square’ for the slaughtered, bullet-ridden bodies that were hung in it almost
every day.” By word and by deed, Fazlullah has proved his unbending commitment to
bringing Sharia to Pakistan, and his preparedness to engage in any level of ruthlessness to
make that happen. While his predecessor had
finally become open to holding peace talks
with the Pakistani state, Fazlullah rejected the
idea of reconciliation once and for all and declared that no talks would be held. Four years
of service as the leader of the TTP may have
moderated Hakimullah Mehsud to make him
amenable to peace talks, but his assassination
and the subsequent rise to power of Mullah Fazlullah set the clock back, re-radicalizing the
organization.
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Pakistani military operations in the FATA in
2009. By then, Baitullah had eliminated most of
his rivals, united most of the local militant groups,
and established a fully-operational insurgent organization that was capable of enduring with
or without him. He had even produced three
deputies – Hakimullah Mehsud, Asmatullah
Mehsud, and Wali-ur- Rehman – any of whom
could comfortably replace Baitullah in the event
of his death. By the time of his assassination,
Baitullah’s inspirational persona had been fully
routinized into an ideology and narrative that
could continue to motivate TTP fighters. And
his operational competence had been institutionalized in the form of organizational bureaucracies, command structures, and new leaders
with skills sufficient to ensure the TTP’s survival.
After Baitullah’s assassination, Hakimullah Mehsud took over as leader of the TTP. Although barely 30 years old then, Hakimullah
proved quite capable of filling Baitullah’s shoes
and moving the TTP forward. Having taken
over a fully established organization, however,
Hakimullah’s job was considerably easier than
that of his predecessor who had started the organization from zero. Hakimullah continued to
build upon Baitullah’s achievements, considerably stepping up the TTP’s size and the sphere
and scope of its operations.
Radicalizing Impact of Insurgent Leader Assassination
Killing an insurgent leader is likely to
radicalize his organization in two ways: (1)
through the “martyrdom effect”, and (2) by facilitating the rise of radical elements within the
insurgent organization.
The Martyrdom Effect

or to become a model.”
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Revolutionary movements generally value traits such as heroism, bravery, selflessness,

and sacrifice. Martyrdom ranks at the top of the
value list, demonstrating the highest level of sacrifice a revolutionary can make in the pursuit
of his or her cause. The concept of martyrdom
originated in religious movements, and has had
a special place within the histories of the three
major monotheistic religions. The mythologies
surrounding the sacrifice of the Rabbi Akiba
ben-Josef, the crucifixion of Jesus Crist, and the
suffering and death of Imam Hussein, for instance,
continue to have great symbolic importance
to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, respectively.
In more recent times, secular revolutionary movements have embraced the concept
Martyrdom was more strongly revered, and effectively used as a tool of propaganda, by totalitarian
revolutionary movements such as communists and
fascists. Stripping the concept of any religious connotation, communist revolutionary movements
across the world embraced martyrdom as a phenomenon that proved the greatest human sacrifice
in the path of the communist cause. The martyrdom of Hans Beimler, the German International
Brigade Commissar, in the Spanish Civil War, for
instance, was commemorated in songs for his communist comrades to sing as they left for battle. The
preservation of Vladimir Lenin’s body is a symbolic
display of a great leader who sacrificed his life in the
path of the revolution and the cause of communism.

of martyrdom and have used it strategically as
a tool of propaganda to generate sympathy for
their causes, increase unity within their organizations, and recruit more followers and fighters.
The American revolutionaries were fully aware of
the power of martyrdom, and sought to utilize it
to further their cause. As Eyal Naveh points out:
Sacrifice lay at the core of the fascist
ideology, and fascist movements utilized the
concept of martyrdom very effectively to rally
support. As Donald Allgrove writes of the Nazi
propaganda on the use of martyrdom, “Josef
Goebbels ensured that each military organization could claim an archetypical martyr. The

SA identified with its fallen songwriter Horst
Wessel. Herbert Norkus - butchered by communist thugs - inspired the Hitler Youth organizations. Assassinated Obergruppenfuhrer
Reinhard Heydrich served as a symbol for the
SS. Finally, the Luftwaffe commemorated their
leading fallen ace, Colonel Werner Molders.”
Perhaps the strongest celebrators of martyrdom are the modern-day Islamist militant
groups. The Arabic equivalent of the term martyrdom is shahada, which literally means to “see”,
to “witness” to “testify”, or to “become a model”.
Shahada is central to the concept of jihad, which
can mean either a personal endeavor for inner purification, or an armed struggle in defense of the
Islamic faith. In the context of modern Islamist
militancy, jihad exclusively refers to the latter
definition, and thus a shaheed is one who sacrifices his or her life in the path of Islam. This simplification of the terms jihad and shaheed may be
problematic from a theological perspective, but
providing the correct or the most encompassing
definition for these terms is not the purpose of
this paper. The intention here is to demonstrate
the way modern-day Islamist militant groups
view the phenomenon of martyrdom and how
they seek to exploit it for strategic purposes. And
for this purpose, the above definitions suffice.
Islamists view martyrdom not only as
the highest degree of sacrifice one can make in
the path of Islam, but also as the biggest prize
one can receive from God. They claim that by
becoming a martyr, one will get a direct pass
to paradise. For instance, the Khomeini regime
during the Iran-Iraq war issued a “key to the
Garden of Eden” – a plastic key made in Taiwan
– to every Basij fighter going to the front, symbolizing martyrs’ direct admission to paradise.
The Basij engaged in what came to be known as
“human wave raids” where thousands of elderly
or young children marched to the front – most
of them unarmed. The purpose of these raids
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was to “clear mines, breach obstacles (often by
laying on top of concertina wire), and to absorb
enemy fire.” Martyrdom, therefore, is idolized
as something that each and every member of
an Islamist militant movement should aspire
to. Osama bin Laden praised martyrdom time
and again in his speeches, and even purportedly
wished his own martyrdom when in one of his
recorded tapes he said, “I pray my demise isn’t
on a coffin bearing green mantles. I wish my
demise to be in the eagle’s belly … Indeed on
my demise I will become a martyr”. And a martyr he did become in the eyes of his followers.
Islamist militant groups use martyrdom
to legitimize abhorrent violent actions such as
suicide operations, and motivate fighters to engage in such activities. Suicide attacks, for instance, are called “martyrdom operations”. Often
before the attacks, statements by would-be suicide bombers are recorded on tape in which they
testify that they are undertaking the operations
willingly and that they are proud to have the
chance to achieve martyrdom. When possible,
militant groups also record the attacks on tape,
and then edit them to include the initial testimony
along with propagandistic narrations, songs and
special effects. These videos are released on jihadi
websites to attract support and recruit fighters,
and are shown internally to boost motivation.
While Islamist militant groups venerate all of their martyrs, a leader’s martyrdom is
special, as they see in him a model and example,
one whom they wish to follow and emulate. A
charismatic leader is greatly revered when alive,
but his martyrdom further idolizes his persona
and validates his path. He turns into the embodiment of righteousness, selflessness, heroism,
and sacrifice whose legacy is to be followed and
whose blood is to be avenged. This inspires further violence on the part of the insurgent group,
both as a means of retaliation for the death of the
leader, as well as a demonstration of the group’s
willingness and ability to continue the path of
the slain leader.
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This trend can be clearly observed in the
case of the killing of two TTP leaders. Immediately after the assassination of Baitullah Mehsud
in August 2009, his successor, Hakimullah Mehsud, vowed to target U.S. interests worldwide,
including American cities, to avenge Baitullah’s
martyrdom. In December 2009, Humam Khalil
Abu Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian national who
had posed as an informant, carried out a suicide attack inside a CIA base in Afghanistan’s
Khost Province, killing 7 operatives and injuring 6. After the incident, the TTP released
a video showing Hakimullah Mehsud sitting
beside al-Balawi, stating that the forthcoming
suicide attack against the CIA would be in retaliation for Baitullah Mehsud’s assassination.
In 2011, the TTP released a video tape, declaring that it would soon deliver ten coordinated attacks in the U.S. and Europe, this time to
avenge the martyrdom of Osama bin Laden.
It is too soon to determine what the TTP
will manage to do in retaliation to the recent
assassination of Hakimullah Mehsud, but the
organization has vowed to step up its campaign
of violence and conduct a wave of terror attacks
to avenge the death of its slain leader. Blaming
the Pakistani government for collaborating with
the U.S., a high-ranking TTP militant Asmatullah Shaheen is quoted to have said, “We will
target security forces, government installations,
political leaders and police” in retaliation for
Hakimullah’s assassination.
The Rise of Radical Figures
The targeted killing of an insurgent leader is likely to facilitate the rise to power of more
radical figures within the group, for at least two
reasons. First, the leader’s assassination gives the
organization a sense of being under siege and
attack. The incident could be perceived as the
beginning of a widespread offensive by the state
with the objective of completely uprooting the
organization. Fear and paranoia fills the orga-

nization, demonstrating the need for hardening
and tightening of defenses. A time of perceived
distress, fear, and anger naturally strengthens
the position of the more hardline figures to
replace the slain leader and defend the organization against the expected state onslaught.
After all, a time of war requires a “war-time
consigliere”, to use the Godfather terminology.
Second, leadership requires pragmatism,
and pragmatism in turn necessitates flexibility
and moderation. The act of serving in leadership
positions often increases individuals’ pragmatism against the rigidity of their ideological aspirations, given the scope of their responsibilities
and the reality of things they need to deal with.
Thus, more often than not, insurgent leaders become relatively moderate in their behavior over
time even if they still cling to their ideological
ambitions. But experience comes with time, so
it takes several years for an insurgent leader to
obtain the needed experience and appreciate the
necessity of flexibility and moderation. Once a
leader is killed, however, a new, usually younger and more idealistic figure will come to power.
The new leader needs to go through the experiences of his predecessor in order to learn his
lessons and become more pragmatic, during
which time the behavior of the insurgent group
will be more radical. Killing an insurgent organization’s successive leaders, therefore, means
working against the possible moderation of
the organization by repeating the cycle of radicalization-to-moderation-to-re-radicalization.
Conclusion
The relationship between charismatic
insurgent leaders and insurgent organizations
is dialectical: Charismatic leaders are critical to
the birth of insurgent organizations, as they rally support behind their cause, recruit fighters,
mobilize resources, and establish organizational
structures and chains of command. But the more
successful they are at setting up the organization

over time, the less important they become to the
functioning and survival of the organization.
This is because their charisma – inspirational
persona and operational competence – is routinized and institutionalized within the organization, surviving the leader in the shape of a legacy
and a durable structure. Therefore, assassinating
an insurgent leader will at best have a minimum
impact on the organization, i.e. by temporarily damaging the fighters’ morale and demonstrating the state’s will to fight the insurgents.
From a counterinsurgency perspective,
however, these marginal benefits are greatly
outweighed by the unwanted consequences of
assassinating insurgent leaders due to the martyrdom effect and the radicalizing impact of the
tactic. As seen in the case of the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, targeted assassination turns
the slain leader into an iconic martyr, inspiring
intensified retaliatory violence by the group.
Meanwhile, the leader’s assassination puts the
insurgent organization in a defensive posture,
aiding the rise to prominence of more zealous
figures within the organization, which sets back
the clock to the organization’s gradual moderation. The implications of this analysis for counterinsurgency policy are straight forward. States
that are involved in fighting insurgencies must
refrain from killing top insurgent leaders. Instead, focusing on the elimination of mid-level
commanders, who have practical operational
value to insurgent organizations, and whose targeted killing will likely generate fewer unwanted
consequences, might be a better policy option
within an overall counterinsurgency campaign.
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